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TIE FINANCING OF COOPERATIVES AND
CONDOMINIUMS: A RETROSPECTIVE
RICHARD J. KANE*
In real estate it is rare indeed to witness an entire area of
specialized practice evolve from embryonic stage through matu-
ration. Yet, with respect to American condominium law, many of
us have had that opportunity.
Although some commentators trace the concept of the con-
dominium to ancient Rome,1 it is more generally accepted that
the concept was introduced in Europe during the twelfth cen-
tury.2 One of the earliest identifiable statutory recognitions of
the condominium is found in the Napoleonic Code of 1804.' The
"Mr. Kane is a partner in the firm of Thelen Reid & Priest LLP, where he is the
Chairman of the Real Estate and Real Estate Finance Department. Mr. Kane has
served as the Chairman of more than 30 two-day educational programs on real es-
tate sponsored or co-sponsored by the Practicing Law Institute, the New York State
Bar Association, The World Research Group, Continuing Education of the Bar
(California), the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education, the Institute for
International Research, and the New York University Real Estate Institute. He also
produced and chaired the Practicing Law Institute Television and Cassette Series
on Real Estate and Real Estate Finance. For several years, Mr. Kane was a member
of the faculty of New York University, teaching seminars in the structuring of real
estate transactions. Mr. Kane has delivered well over 200 lectures on real estate
subjects and has written numerous articles on real estate and real estate-related
matters. Mr. Kane served as the Regional President of Phi Delta Phi International
Legal Fraternity for ten years, as President of New York Civil Court Arbitrators As-
sociation, and as a member of the New York Judicial Screening Committee for two
years. He is a member of the Advisory Board of First American Title Insurance
Company.
1 See Condominium Workshop, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 677, 716 (1974) (setting
forth remarks of William H. Parry discussing several theories on the origin of the
condominium concept, including Rome, England, and Germany); Curtis J. Berger,
Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 987, 987 n.5
(1963) (citing theories on the time and place of condominium origin).
2 See John E. Cribbet, Condominium-Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1963) (discussing the recorded history of the condomin-
ium in twelfth century German cities and during the Middle Ages in France and
Switzerland).
: "Article 664 of the Napoleonic Code, which dates from 1804, refers to the re-
pair and reconstruction of a building whose different floors belong to various pro-
prietors." Berger, supra note 1, at 988 n.5. Article 664 specified the maintenance
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first sophisticated U.S. condominium statute was enacted in
1958 by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.4 Some states there-
after enacted similar statutes.5 Initially, there was little to indi-
cate that this innovation would become popular. However, with
the enactment of § 234 of the National Housing Act in 1961,6 the
Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") was authorized to in-
sure mortgage loans secured by condominium units in those
states that had enacted condominium laws. Because "FHA fi-
nancing" as it is commonly called (although it is more accurately
described as "FHA-insured financing") was at that time one of
the most popular means of financing the purchase of a home, the
creation of § 234 was critical to the growth of the condominium
form of ownership.7 Primarily because of the FHA imprimatur,
by 1969 every state in the United States had adopted legislation
authorizing condominium regimes.8
Although the concept of the cooperative form of ownership
appears to have a shorter overall history than the concept of the
condominium, the cooperative form of ownership of real estate
has been around the United States for a much longer period of
time than the condominium, 9 first appearing in the United
responsibilities when different owners shared floors, staircases, and roofs. See Wil-
liam K. Kerr, Condominium-Statutory Implementation, 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 3
n.7 (1963).
'See Horizontal Property Act of 1958, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, §§ 1291-1293k
(1993). A simple statute authorizing condominiums was first enacted in Puerto Rico
in 1951. See Berger, supra note 1, at 987 n.4. The Horizontal Property Act is com-
monly called The Uniform Condominium Act. See Ray E. Sweat, Air Rights and
Transferable Development Rights, 331 PRAC. L. INST. REAL EST. 127, 129 (1989).
" See RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 632.2[3], at 54-37
(Patrick J. Rohan ed. 1998) (noting that other states soon followed Puerto Rico's
lead, and within ten years, all other jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia
and the Virgin Islands, had some type of a condominium statute); Sweat, supra note
4, at 129 (stating that many states patterned their condominium statutes on the
1958 statute and that, in 1962, the Federal Housing Administration promulgated a
Model Condominium Statute, which also served as a framework for many states).
New York enacted its Condominium Act in 1964. The Uniform Condominium Act,
however, was not developed until 1977.
6 National Housing Act of 1949 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715y
(1989)).See Kerr, supra note 3, at 1 ("Section 234 is directly responsible for the advent
of [the] condominium in the continental United States."); Marketing Report: Condo
Starts Soar From Coast to Coast, 1 CONDOMINIUM REP., May 1973, at 3-4.
'See 7 POWELL, supra note 5, § 632.2[3], at 54-35.
'See PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL PROPERTY § 9.01, at 9-1 (1981). First becoming
important after World War I, cooperatives are a relatively new type of housing.
Still, co-ops have a longer history than condominiums, which were widely created
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States in the second half of the nineteenth century."0 It has been
suggested that the cooperative concept is Finnish in origin." The
cooperative form gained popularity in response to the housing
shortage that followed World War I and in response to the rent
control statutes that followed World War II. Early cooperatives
were also popular because that form of ownership allowed
wealthy apartment dwellers to decide who lived in their build-
ings. The first examples of cooperative ownership were found in
New York City.'
Notwithstanding the earlier start that the cooperative con-
cept enjoyed in the United States, that form of ownership never
developed the widespread appeal that the condominium form of
ownership was able to generate. Today, the cooperative form of
ownership remains most prevalent in New York and Chicago. 3
Cooperatives are also found, albeit with less frequency, in Los
Angeles and San Francisco, and parts of Florida, 4 however, the
only in 1962. See id. Thus, when compared to condominiums, more accurate predic-
tions as to the future of cooperatives are possible. See id. The use of cooperatives in
this country actually dates back further, to the late nineteenth century. See 15A AM.
JUR. 2D Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments § 61 (1976).
10 The earliest reported American case involving a cooperative apartment arose
in 1886, Barrington Apartment Ass'n v. Watson, 38 Hun 545 (N.Y. 1886). There,
plaintiff corporation constructed apartments to be owned and occupied by its origi-
nal projectors and stockholders. Defendant lessee sought to sublet, notwithstanding
a lease provision prohibiting such subleasing without written consent. The court
granted plaintiffs injunction, prohibiting an unapproved sublease. See 15A AM. JUR.
2D § 61, at 891 n.85.
" See Edward M. Ross, Condominiums in California-The Verge of an Era, 36
S. CAL. L. REV. 351, 352 (1963) (stating that today's prevalent form of corporate
ownership, which utilizes corporate stock and long-term leases, is of Finnish origin);
see also Chester C. McCullough, Jr., Co-operative Apartments in Illinois, 26 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 303, 304 (1948) (discussing the history of the general cooperative
housing concept).
12 See Berger, supra note 1, at 991-92 n. 25; McCullough, supra note 11, at 305;
Ross, supra note 11, at 352 (noting the success of the cooperative during the 1920s
and the post-W.W.ll era).
13 New York City has the largest market for cooperative apartments due to the
co-op's right of self-governance. See Rosemarie Maldonado & Robert D. Rose, The
Application of Civil Rights Laws to Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-ops Bastions of
Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-Selecting Models of Community-Based Living?, 23
FORDHA2I URB. L.J. 1245, 1245 (1996). In 1984, there were 211,000 co-op apart-
ments in New York City. That figure rose to 416,000 in 1995. See N.R. Kleinfield
with Tracie Rozhon, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has Steep Ups and Downs, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al. Cooperative ownership is relatively rare outside New
York City. See Maldonado & Rose, supra, at 1247.
14 See 7 POWELL, supra note 5, § 632.2[2 at 54-34. However, the condominium
remains more popular in other parts of the country; ef Stewart E Sterk, Minority
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cooperative form of ownership is not employed in many parts of
the country, including many large cities. The early history of the
financing of the condominium and cooperative forms of owner-
ship in the United States followed very different tracks, although
today, the financing of these diverse forms of property ownership
has become more parallel.
I. CONDOMINIUM FINANCING
A. The Early Days
The middle to late 1960s marked the real emergence of the
condominium form of ownership in the United States. In those
days, the basic concepts for real estate financing were simple
and traditional. Construction loans were provided to finance the
construction of residential buildings. Construction loans were
typically provided by commercial banks at 1% to 1.5% in excess
of the prime rate, which in 1966 stood at 6% per annum. 5 Sav-
ings banks provided long-term financing (then referred to as a
"permanent loan") for smaller projects, and insurance companies
financed larger projects. Those permanent loans were typically
self-amortizing with terms of twenty-five or thirty years 6 and
Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77 B.U. L. REV. 273, 276 (1997)
(citing the Community Associations Institute's estimate that in 1990, there were
4,847,921 condominium units in the United States and 824,000 cooperative units).
'5 See Federal Reserve Board Listing of the Prime Rate, <http'i/www.
bog.frb.fed.us/releases/Hl5/datalb/prime.txt> [hereinafter Federal Reserve Prime
Rate Website]; see also SALOMON BROTHERS, INC., ANALYTICAL RECORD OF YIELDS
AND YIELD SPREADS, Part IV (1989) (providing a year-by-year table of short-term
market rates).
16 In the 1960s, the principal providers of long-term commercial financing were
insurance companies. Following the disastrous experience of lenders during the
Great Depression, self-amortizing loans became the solution to the Depression-era
problems. Prior to the Depression, "long-term" loans were not very long term, hav-
ing terms of five or seven years. Those loans were made as interest-only loans,
meaning that during the term of the loan, the borrower was required to pay only
interest (most commonly on a monthly basis) and was required to pay the entire
principal at maturity. Historically, those loans were "rolled over" at maturity,
meaning that the lender simply renewed the loan for a new five or seven-year term.
When the Depression hit, the banks were faced with staggering withdrawals and,
therefore, no longer had the deposits to enable the banks to renew the loans. When
the lender demanded repayment of the matured loans, the borrowers, with no other
source of loan proceeds to replace the loan, had no choice but to default. It was
thought that the solution would be to require that loans be made on a self-
amortizing basis so that at maturity no principal payment would be required. Insur-
ance company loans were strictly regulated and, in the 1960s, the typical statute
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were provided on a fixed-rate basis with interest hovering at
about 6% or 7% per annum.
The residential condominium broke the traditional financing
mold for single-building financing. Although the concept of the
construction loan remained the same, the construction loan
would not be paid off through the funding of a permanent loan,
but rather repayments of the construction loan would be derived
from sales proceeds as the condominium units were sold." Indi-
vidual unit purchasers could obtain financing from savings
banks and savings and loan associations ("S&Ls") on a typical
home loan basis.'" In many respects, this form of single-building
financing paralleled the financing of large tract developments of
single-family homes. However, the owner of a single-family
home did not have the added complexities that burdened the
owners of the units in a multi-unit condominium building. These
included owning a home stacked atop and between other homes,
being dependent upon other homeowners for support, utilities
and access, being tied to an owners' association for maintenance,
insurance, reconstruction, or repair of common areas, for as-
sessments for common area expenses, and having to face the
then ever-present recreation lease, to name a few. 9
The condominium first flourished in Florida. The original
vision of Carl Fisher" of Miami Beach as a vacation homeland
required a loan-to-value ratio and self-amortizing loan terms. See, e.g., N.Y. INS.
LAW § 81 (McKinney 1959) (current version at § 1404 (McKinney 1989)).
1 See PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 15.09[41 [a], at 15-288
(1998).
'a See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §
13.2, at 939 (2d ed. 1985).
"For a discussion focusing on the privacy and independence problems facing
unit owners, see Aaron M. Schreiber, The Lateral Housing Development: Condomin-
ium or Home Owners Association?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1134-53 (1968).
2" Carl Fisher was a truly fascinating, "Horatio Alger" figure. He was raised by
his mother after her alcoholic husband abandoned the family. He was considered
the "most stupid boy" in school, and had difficulty walking, primarily because he
was "half-blind" with an astigmatism. He dropped out of school at the age of twelve
to peddle newspapers on trains. His flare for promotion led him to become Indiana's
most successful automobile dealer through such publicity-grabbing stunts as riding
a bicycle across a tightrope twelve stories above the street and drifting across the
business district of Indianapolis in a white automobile hung beneath a vermilion-
colored balloon. He convinced the leaders of the automotive industry to finance the
first paved road across the country, the Lincoln Highway from New York to San
Francisco. Others called him a "crackpot" when he persuaded three partners to help
him build the Indianapolis Speedway, but his wildest scheme was to take a mos-
quito-infested swampland in southern Florida and turn it into Miami Beach. Using
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for wealthy Northerners had long since given way to rows of ho-
tels, middle-class residences and commercial buildings to service
the needs of a growing population.2' By the mid-1960s, many of
the early hotels in the southeast portion of Miami Beach (the
South Beach area) had become run down, single-room retirement
residences. Nevertheless, Florida had become the nation's favor-
ite retirement location. Hundreds of thousands of retiring
Americans were selling homes in the North to seek their retire-
ment homes in the "Sunshine State."' Developers recognized
that they could take the concept of the apartment complex, or a
more modest version of the Levittown' private home develop-
special equipment imported from his native Indiana, he cleared what land there was
and dredged Biscayne Bay to create the main island of Miami Beach and many of
the islands on the beach side of Biscayne Bay. When he was unsuccessful in attract-
ing wealthy business people to adopt Miami Beach as a vacation land, he brought in
an elephant and bathing beauties to promote his dream. Northern newspapers con-
tinuously published stories about the island with pictures of the elephant and the
young ladies, and shortly thereafter Miami Beach (and ultimately, Florida) became
the dream of vacationers and later of retirees throughout the United States. Carl
Fisher lost his fortune while trying to promote Montauk, New York, as the Miami
Beach of the North. The value of all of his holdings plummeted with the unsuccess-
ful Montauk venture and a hurricane that seriously damaged Miami Beach. The
market crash of 1929 wiped out the balance of his fortune. He died in poverty in
1939, living alone in a small house on a side street in Miami Beach. See Steve Hall,
Dredged-up Dreams: Hoosier Carl Fisher Brought His Plan for Miami Beach Up
from the Bottom of Swampland (Jan. 29, 1998) <http://speednet.starnews.com/speed
net/indycar/98/an/0129SN_fisher.html>.
21 See Salvatore LaMonica, Note, Developer Leases Under the Condominium and
Cooperative Relief Act of 1980, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 631, n.2 (1986) (noting that
Florida saw growth in both the 25 to 34 year-old age group as well as the over 65
age Froup, and that both groups found condominium style living desirable).During the 1960s and the early 1970s, the author of this article represented
the construction lender on over 30 condominium construction loans in Florida alone.
See John A. Cutter, Retirement By the Numbers Series: Tales From Retirement, ST.
PETERSBERG TIMES, Mar. 22, 1998, at 4F (noting that Florida is the most popular
retirement spot, for those who move, from 1960 through 1990; retirees came pri-
marily from the northeastern and midwestern states of New York, New Jersey,
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania); LaMonica, supra note 21, at 631 n.2. See also
Alan S. Oser, Part-Time Floridians Influence Building, TAMPA TRB., Feb. 2, 1997,
at 1 (stating that in many parts of Florida, much of the population is "seasonal";
condominiums have become the "motels" of short-term visitors, who initially came
for the low property costs, investment value, and recreational activities).
2At the end of World War II, twelve million American G.I.'s came home to live
in attics, basements and Quonset huts. William Levitt, an entrepreneur from a
family that had been building high-end housing on Long Island's North Shore
(known as the "Gold Coast"), spear-headed an extraordinary venture. In 1947, the
Levitt family purchased 7.3 square miles of potato farm land in an area known as
"Island Trees" in Nassau County, Long Island, New York. Employing the Henry
Ford production line method of constructing simple homes, the Levitts were able to
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ment, and enhance that concept with modest recreational facili-
ties (in most cases). They could then sell the units for a quick
initial profit and take back a recreation lease with escalations to
ensure a continuing long-term profit. 2'
The sale of the units allowed the developers of the condomin-
ium facilities: (a) to pay off their construction loans; (b) to re-
cover all of the developer's own investment in the project (which,
in most cases, was precious little), with none of the liabilities
and responsibilities incurred by their brethren who retained
ownership of multi-family residential projects and who relied on
rent for their long term (and only) profit; and (c) in most cases to
make a handsome immediate profit from the balance of the sales
price.
The recreation lease created a permanent annuity, without
imposing any responsibilities whatsoever on the developer who,
although retaining the nominal position of landlord under the
recreation lease, for all practical purposes, transferred the own-
ership and the maintenance responsibilities for the recreational
facilities to the condominium board. The unit owners basically
paid cash for their units (although in most instances the bulk of
the cash paid to the developer was supplied by the unit owner's
produce quality buildings quickly, cheaply and with remarkable flair in the center of
the New York media spotlight. By 1951, the Levitts had constructed and sold 17,447
mass-produced Cape Cod and ranch houses on that potato farm, which enabled re-
turning veterans and other middle-class Americans to partake in the American
dream. The low prices of the homes, combined with the availability of government-
insured mortgage financing for veterans, made this venture a stunning success. The
"Levittown Community," as it became known, contained common areas, including a
"village green," swimming pools, and schools. It made popular the concept of build-
ing a community consisting of more than just a row of identical houses, but one fea-
turing communal facilities. While William Levitt lived a life of luxury and was noted
for his extraordinary generosity, forty-two years after the completion of the last
house in Levittown, with the Levitt organization on the brink of bankruptcy, he lay
dying, unable to pay for treatment at a hospital which years earlier had been built
with the millions of dollars that he had contributed. See Geoffrey Mohan, Suburban
Pioneers, NEWSDAY <http'/lwww.lihistory.com/specsechslevone.htm>; Charlie Ze-
hren, The Dream Builder, NEWSDAY <http://www.ihistory.comlspecsec/hslevpro.ht
in>.
24 See John R. Lewis & Kenneth A. Jessell, The Condominium Recreation Lease
Controversy, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 7, 7-8 (1980) (observing that developers could charge
unreasonably high fees for use of maintenance facilities, which escalated over cost of
living increases, and then demand excessive buyout prices); Lisa A. Steinhardt,
Note, Unit Owners' Ability to Cancel Contracts Under the Condominium Act, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 589, 589-91 (1988) (observing that the Congressional intent behind
the Condominium and Cooperative Relief Act of 1980 was to curb abuse by allowing
purchasers to terminate unconscionable contracts).
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lending institution), paid maintenance to the condominium as-
sociation for the upkeep of the condominium's common facilities
and paid the recreation lease rent to the developer for the right
to use the recreational facilities that the unit owners had essen-
tially already purchased. To add further insult to that injury, in
virtually every recreation lease, the rent escalated with in-
creases in the Consumer Price Index.'
B. The First Boom
Many of the developers who climbed aboard the gravy train
in the early days of condominium development sought financing
from large commercial banks in the northeast United States.
Lenders initially had significant concerns as to whether this
"new-fangled" form of ownership would gain market acceptance
among the intended customers for this new residential product.
26
To defend against the risk that the condominium units might not
sell, lenders imposed rigid pre-sale conditions to the loans. It
was not uncommon in most construction loans for lenders to re-
quire that the developer pre-sell fifty to seventy-five percent of
the residential units before the lender would fund the first dollar
of the construction loan.
The developer would acquire the land, sometimes with the
aid of a land loan, and construct a few model units. In the case
of the Levittown-type development, four or five model homes and
sometimes a recreational building or a clubhouse, would be con-
See Barry A. Mandelkorn et al., The Non- Unconscionability of Condominium
Recreational Leases, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 563, 567-68 (1980) for a discussion on the
impact such leases had on unit owners. The Consumer Price Index ("CPI") is com-
monly used as a method for increasing or escalating streams of payment, including
items such as rent. Generally, the formula employed in most rent escalation provi-
sions contemplates that the percentage increase in CPI over a defined period of time
(e.g., one year, five years, ten years) would result in an identical percentage increase
in the rent. Thus, for example, in a lease that has a CPI rent increase every five
years, if at the end of the first five years of the lease term the percentage increase in
CPI was 12%, the rent for the ensuing five years of the lease would likewise be 12%
higher than it had been during the first five years of the lease. Typically, the esca-
lation provision would contain a floor so that the rent would not go below a certain
level (most commonly, the rent during the immediately preceding period) were CPI
to move lower during the measurement period. Cf. Milton R. Friedman, Rent Esca-
lation Under Business and Commercial Leases, 351 PRAC. L. INST. REAL EST. 383,
398 (1990) (asserting that the CPI is not the proper index to be used for rent escala-
tion, because "commodity prices have little relation" to the costs of building opera-
tion).
16 See ROHAN, supra note 17, § 15.01.
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structed as the lure during the pre-sale part of the program. The
unit purchasers would look at the model homes and buildings
and select a lot from a map in the sales office. In the case of the
high-rise or mid-rise apartment complex, a small building con-
taining a few typical model apartment-like units would be con-
structed to entice prospective customers to purchase residential
apartment units, after which the models would be demolished to
make way for the construction of the apartment building. De-
spite the initial concerns of the lenders, retirees came in droves
to purchase condominium units. These buyers signed contracts
for projects that had not yet been started in communities that
were no more than sketches on a bulletin board in a sales office.
By the early 1970s, nothing in the real estate arena was hotter
than the residential condominium.27
The acceptance of the commercial condominium followed
fairly quickly on the heels of the residential condominium. Ini-
tially, the concept of the commercial condominium was intro-
duced in mixed-use buildings. One of the best known examples
of the early mixed-use condominium is the Olympic Tower
building, situated next to St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York
City. The construction of this 50-story building was commenced
in 1969. The first floor of the building is employed for entrances,
retail shops, and a restaurant. Floors two through, and includ-
ing, twenty-three of Olympic Tower are used as office space, one
floor is devoted to mechanical equipment for the offices, and the
upper twenty-six floors are residential units. The first twenty-
three floors of the building collectively constituted a single com-
mercial condominium unit, while each of the residential units
was treated as a separate unit. The single commercial unit was
then rented in typical office-building fashion, and treated as a
separate building from the upper residential floors. The residen-
tial units utilized a separate entrance and separate elevators.
One of the earliest examples of the all-commercial (in that case,
all-office) condominium building was the Blue Cross-Blue Shield
Building located at 100 Summer Street in downtown Boston, the
construction of which was commenced in 1973. 8
27 See, e.g., Jon Nordheimer, South Grapples With its Success, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 1973, at 29 (stating "the pace of development and immigration in the last several
years [in Florida] has been frenetic"). Economic forces encouraged conversion of
rental housing to condominium and cooperative ownership.
28 The author of this article represented the construction lender in the con-
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In the 1960s, condominium developers were generally sea-
soned real estate veterans. However, by the 1970s, the pool of
people developing residential condominiums had expanded geo-
metrically to include many who had never tried development in
the past and who had no experience in anything even akin to
real estate development. Money had become readily available.
Real estate investment trusts ("REITs") had proliferated in the
lending landscape and officers at banks and REITs were falling
over each other in an effort to pump money out the door. Con-
struction loans were being priced at three and four points above
the prime rate, and lenders were more than willing to advance
money approaching one hundred percent of development costs
(and in a few instances more than one hundred percent). No one
seemed to care that the lenders' commitment letter forms still
contained pre-sale requirements of fifty percent of the units, be-
cause the pre-sale condition was so easy to satisfy. By this time,
the construction lenders were making land loans, financing one
hundred percent of the developers' cost of acquiring the land as
well as financing the construction of pre-sale models, recrea-
tional facilities and site improvements. Lenders and developers
alike were raking in big profits and the condo purchasers were
delighted with their new homes. Everyone was happy.
C. The First Downturn
In 1974, the party came to a screeching halt. During 1973
and 1974, America was hit hard by an oil embargo by the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC"). That
embargo resulted in an extraordinary escalation in the cost of
asphalt, a major component in the construction budgets for
large-scale projects.2 9 The cost of vitreous china, tar paper and
struction loans for both Olympic Tower and the Blue Cross-Blue Shield buildings.
The Olympic Tower financing was also interesting because it involved one of the
earliest financings of "air rights" (transferable development rights) from neighbor-
ing properties along Fifth Avenue and the side streets, and involved one of the ear-
liest (if not the first) transfers of prior mortgages (one from a property in Buffalo,
New York, to the site) and the assignment of those mortgages to the construction
lender to save substantial amounts of mortgage recording taxes.
29The decision by the OPEC cartel to reduce oil production for political reasons
had the effect of substantially increasing the price of a barrel of oil world-wide.
Within a relatively short span of time, the price of oil, which had remained at levels
under $4.00 per barrel for more than fifty years, suddenly went to $8.00 per barrel,
and over the next few years reached a high point in excess of $32.00 per barrel. See
WTI Crude Oil Posted Price-U.S. First Purchaser's Crude Oil Price, <http://
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asphaltic shingles, among other building products, also spiked
dramatically, causing significant cost overruns in all develop-
ments, including high-rise condominiums, albeit to a lesser ex-
tent because far less asphalt is required for roadways in a high-
rise project.3 Interruptions in the supply and delivery of those
materials caused significant delays in the construction of proj-
ects. To compound the problem substantially, the prime rate,
which had been at 4.75% in 1972, shot up to 12% by August
1974.3' That increase in the interest rate alone added another
$800,000 in interest payments to a typical $10,000,000 project,
even assuming the project could be completed on time. Any de-
lay in construction would further increase the interest cost as
the meter continued to run. Budgets for condominium projects
were in complete chaos. It quickly became clear to the develop-
ing and lending communities that condominium units could no
longer be built for anywhere near the initially contemplated cost.
Suddenly, the pre-sale requirement, which had been de-
signed to ensure the project's success, now guaranteed its fail-
ure. Having pre-sold almost all of the units in the project, devel-
opers found that they could no longer build those units for the
prices at which those units had already been pre-sold. Since the
beginning of the 1970s, developers had been investing virtually
none of their own money in condominium projects. Now, with
construction costs greatly exceeding the money available from
construction loans, developers could finish projects only if they
were willing to pour in substantial sums from their own personal
financial resources. Those personal funds could never be recov-
ered because the units had been pre-sold at prices that would not
even cover the construction loans now carrying bloated interest
costs. With virtually nothing of their own to lose, and nothing to
gain by dumping portions of their personal fortunes into the pro-
oilworld.comllopost.htm>.
"" See, e.g., GAF Raises Roofing Prices, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1975, at 7 (stating
that GAF corporation increased the price of roofing products due to "recent rash of
prices increases for asphalt"); Richard W. Duesenberg, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title, 38 BuS. LAW. 1109, 1113 (1983) (noting that in January, 1974,
Shell Oil jumped its asphalt price from $44 to $76 per ton). OPEC was not the only
problem. See Plumbing Concerns Settle U.S. Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1971, at
74 (discussing Justice Department's proposed settlement forbidding price fixing of
vitreous china plumbing fixtures, by eight major plumbing manufacturers accused
in civil antitrust suit).
31 See Federal Reserve Prime Rate Website, supra note 15.
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verbial "rat-hole," developers simply defaulted on their con-
struction loans and walked away from their unfinished projects.
Lenders, reluctantly at first, but later in droves, foreclosed on in-
credible numbers of unfinished condominium projects. 3 2
The foreclosing lenders then had a choice of completing the
project at a substantial loss or simply abandoning it. Unit pur-
chasers who had signed contracts for unfinished units commonly
lost their deposits, because at that time there was no require-
ment that the developer hold those deposits in escrow.33 In order
to keep interest costs down, even when the prime rate was only
4.75%, the developer generally delayed the need to draw down
construction loan proceeds (on which the developer paid interest)
by plowing the unit purchaser's down payment money into con-
struction as soon as the down payment was received.
Lenders who foreclosed on the projects and terminated the
rights of the pre-sale contract vendees, many of whom had been
placed in harm's way by the bank's pre-sale requirement, sud-
denly found a new problem. Although the number of people
wanting to retire and move to the retirement projects of the
sunny south did not diminish, the number of those who were fi-
nancially able to do so dropped dramatically. The phrase usually
used to describe this problem was "disintermediation of funds."'
With interest rates rising dramatically, the American public
was pulling its money out of savings banks and S&L's and put-
ting that money into high-yield instruments. 5 The savings
22 See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Assorted Ills Plague Florida's Condominium
Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1974, at 20. Estimates indicated that of 900 construc-
tion projects under construction, one in three faced bankruptcy or deep debt. See id.
During this downturn in real estate, the author of this article foreclosed on con-
struction loans on behalf of construction lenders throughout the United States, in-
cluding several condominium projects located in Florida. The author also repre-
sented construction lenders in many "workouts" of condominium construction loans
all around the country, many of which related to Florida projects.
Today, several jurisdictions have statutes requiring developers of residential
construction projects to hold unit down payments in escrow. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 718.202 (West 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514A-67 (Michie 1985).
" See BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF BANKING TERMS 150 (3d ed. 1997) (defining
"disintermediation" of funds as the "withdrawal of funds from interest-bearing ac-
counts when rates on competing financial instruments, such as money market mu-
tual funds, stocks, bonds, and so on, offers the investor a better return").
3' See Arthur F. Burns, Statement Before the Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, Sept. 12, 1973, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 658, 659 (1973) (noting that signs of de-
veloping problems in housing finance became evident early in 1973 when the inflow
of consumer savings to commercial banks began to shrink, making lenders less ea-
ger and subsequently causing increased interest rates on mortgage loans).
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banks and the S&L's, which had been the traditional sources of
home loans, suddenly found themselves without cash and, there-
fore, unable to make more loans. The net result was that would-
be retirees could not sell their homes in the north because the
prospective purchasers for those homes could not obtain mort-
gage financing to do so. Even when those retirees were able to
rid themselves of their real estate obligations in other parts of
the country, loans were not available for them to purchase the
units owned by the banks in retirement locations. Prospective
purchasers were out of the market unless they were willing to
purchase their retirement homes on an all-cash basis.
Lenders who completed the construction of condominium
units would then have a difficult task selling those units, and
were facing the prospect of holding them for a fairly long period
of time. Adding to this dilemma, Section 29 of the National
Bank Act3 further imposed a requirement that national banks
(then the major source of construction loans) dispose of real es-
tate acquired by foreclosure within five years of the acquisition
of that property.37 Holding the property for a long period of time
was not a legal option. The lenders were faced with other pres-
sures too. Wall Street was demanding that the banks write
down their loan portfolios, take charges, and dispose of the fore-
closed property as quickly as possible. Most banks booked those
losses as quickly as they could be quantified. In most cases, the
write-downs were severe, and in many cases to exaggeratedly
low values.
Lenders sought solutions in various ways. In many in-
stances, the banks hired developers to complete the construction
of the foreclosed projects and to sell them on behalf of the banks,
often at deep discounts. In other instances, lenders sold the
foreclosed projects to favored developers at deep discounts, and
the same banks loaned those favored developers nearly one hun-
dred percent of the cash necessary to acquire the project from the
bank. Since the loans had been written down so severely, the
value of the defaulted loans (or real estate that the bank had ac-
3' 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1994).
37 See id. However, a national banking association can hold the real estate for
more than five years if the association applies to the Comptroller of the Currency,
and can establish that the association made a good faith effort to dispose of the real
estate within the initial 5 year period and disposal of the real estate within the ini-
tial five year period would be detrimental. See id. But under no circumstances may
the time period exceed an additional five years. See id.
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quired at foreclosure of defaulted loans) appeared on the books of
the bank at far lower values than the true values of those loans
(or that real estate), even under the depressed market conditions
that existed at that time. As a matter of creative bookkeeping,
the banks booked a "profit" on the sale of the loans or the fore-
closed property because the sale (even at bargain discount prices
to favored developers) resulted in sales prices that were signifi-
cantly higher than the book values that had resulted from the
write-downs. 8 As a second "benefit" to the banks, a bank that
loaned money to those developers who (literally) took the project
from the bank was then able to show that the purchase-money
loan it had advanced to achieve its "profit" was then a perform-
ing loan on its books. As a result of this creative bookkeeping,
banks were showing significant "profit" on real estate transac-
tions and loans, even though the real estate market was still in
the doldrums, and even though the banks were practically giving
valuable real estate away. And, of course, senior management at
many banks vowed that they would never again be involved in
real estate financing!
D. Round Two
As market conditions began to improve toward the end of
the 1970s, a few lenders began to venture back into the world of
real estate financing. As is always the case in the early recovery
phase of the real estate cycle, the lenders insisted that all real
estate financing would be underwritten conservatively and ad-
ministered with great care. And so it was as other lenders
watched their braver competitors safely making profits in real
estate, they too gradually moved back into the marketplace with
conservative practices. 9 However, by this time, banks had
8 A "write down" is an accounting method used to allocate losses on a balance
sheet, by transferring "a portion of the balance of an asset to an expense account
due to a decrease in the value of [the] asset." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1609 (6th
ed. 1990).
39 There was an unprecedented boom in the real estate market in the 1980s. See
Alex E. Sadler, Note, The Inherent Ambiguity of Commercial Real Estate Values, 13
VA. TAX REV. 787, 787 (1994). "Between 1980 and 1989, lenders financed and devel-
opers built approximately 5.38 billion square feet of office space-about as much as
was standing in 1979." Id. at 788. S&Ls also took advantage of the 1980s opportuni-
ties by making profit-sharing and equity participation loans in commercial real es-
tate. See Clifford L. Fry & Donald R. House, Economic Issues in the Defense of Di-
rectors and Officers of Financial Institutions, 110 BANKING L.J. 542, 548 (1993)
(describing the shift in lending from commercial to residential real estate).
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downsized or totally eliminated the real estate departments that
they had grown in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The new
lending officers that would be introduced to the real estate mar-
ket during the recovery phase had no experience with the prob-
lems that led to the market collapse at the end of the previous
real estate cycle. Consequently, as the market heated up again,
these new lending officers, with no downside experience, were
destined to face similar problems at the inevitable end of the up-
cycle that their counterparts had faced when the balloon burst in
the mid-1970s.
As the 1980s began, real estate again became a hot market.
Building "values" continued to rise dramatically and lenders
again began to compete for the opportunity to finance projects
that were rapidly becoming overpriced. At this point, the financ-
ing of condominiums and cooperatives began to merge.
II. COOPERATiVE FINANCING
The Early Days
If, in the early stages of the condominium era, lenders found
that loans to the owners of condominium units were unusual, in
the early days of cooperative financing, they found that loans to
the "owners" of cooperative apartments were downright odd. In
the case of condominiums, at least the lenders were dealing with
security interests in real estate. The "owner" of a cooperative
apartment, on the other hand, does not "own" the unit, but
rather purchases stock in the cooperative corporation that owns
the building. The unit owner then obtains from the cooperative
corporation (the owner of the building) a "proprietary lease,"
which entitles the unit owner to occupy (as a tenant) a particular
apartment in the building.0 While the net effect of the coopera-
40 The "unit owner" of a cooperative apartment, thus, is really a stockholder in
the corporation that owns the building, and that "unit owner," who no doubt per-
ceives himself or herself as an owner of the "co-op" or apartment, is no more than a
tenant of that space. Thus, "such a person is customarily referred to as a 'tenant
stockholder.' " Joel E. Miller, Condominiums and Cooperatives, 16 J. REAL EST.
TAX N 265, 267 (1991). The proprietary lease, for example, "may contain provisions
authorizing a termination of all the proprietary leases upon the happening of cer-
tain specified events, such as the sale or condemnation of the apartment." 15A AM.
JUR. 2D Condominiums and Cooperative Apartments § 65 (1976). A proprietary lease
is essential because a shareholder has no right to occupy the cooperative without it.
See id.
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tive form of ownership is essentially the same as the condomin-
ium form of ownership, the legal ramifications are quite differ-
ent.41
Initially, financing for cooperative apartments was available
only at the "building level" and not at the "unit level."' The con-
struction financing of a cooperative apartment building was es-
sentially no different than the financing of a traditional residen-
tial apartment building. Although construction loans could have
been paid off with the proceeds of the sale of shares in the coop-
erative apartment building, historically the construction loans
were either converted into "permanent" loans42 at the close of a
construction phase, or refinanced by permanent loans from other
sources.
While the concept of a note secured by a traditional mort-
gage on a residential apartment building is no different whether
the collateral pledged as security is held by the borrower in tra-
ditional ownership or by a cooperative corporation, the loan un-
41 For instance, a condominium regime is a fee simple estate, while a co-op is a
long-term renewable leasehold estate. This makes mortgage financing and title in-
surance easier for condominiums. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Condominiums and Coop-
erative Apartments § 4 (1976) ("[T]he unit owner in a condominium has an interest
in real property which descends to his heirs as any other realty would.... On the
other hand, the tenant-stockholder in a cooperative association is the owner of
shares of stock which pass as personalty to his personal representatives and which
may be subject to securities regulation."). See Lawrence J. Fineberg, Common Inter-
est Real Estate-A Primer for the General Practitioner, N.J. LAW., Jan. 1996, at 10.
New York co-op boards have significant influence over such matters as the financing
of units, the design and alteration of units and the right to determine who may oc-
cupy the apartments. See Sterk, supra note 14, at 277. In contrast, condominium
associations generally do not have the power to veto prospective purchasers. See id.;
see also Phyllis M. Rubenstein & William A. Walsh, Jr., Little House of Horrors:
May a Condominium Association Be Held Liable for Failure to Provide Adequate
Security or Maintenance in the Common Areas, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 127, 129 (1988)
(stating that condominium associations are potentially liable to unit owners for lack
of security or failure to maintain common areas).
42 As noted in note 16, supra, prior to the Great Depression, permanent loans
tended to be interest-only loans, five to seven years in duration. In order to elimi-
nate the risk that the developer could not pay off the principal at maturity, post-
Depression era loans were longer term loans (twenty to thirty years) written on an
amortizing basis, which would result in the substantial reduction (if not the repay-
ment in full) of the loan at maturity. In the 1970s, however, lenders became quite
unhappy holding long-term fixed instruments at rates that may have become most
unattractive during a period of high interest. Thus, in order to address the volatility
in interest rates, long-term lenders developed a "new" product, which they called
the "bullet loan," or the "Canadian roll-over," both of which were three-, five- or
seven-year loans written on an interest-only basis. In essence, this 'new" product
was identical to the pre-Depression loan format that had failed after 1929.
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derwriting was somewhat more complicated in the case of the
cooperative apartment because the lenders considered the busi-
ness of real estate and real estate financing to be a "people"
business. Lenders were more comfortable making loans to de-
velopers whom they knew or to developers who had an estab-
lished track record. Furthermore, lenders believed (and still be-
lieve) that developers would be more likely to have the economic
wherewithal to fund the project in the event that the building oc-
cupancy did not provide enough capital to operate the building
and pay debt service in full. The concept of lending to a coop-
erative corporation managed by an elected group of homeowners,
who likely had no experience in managing an apartment build-
ing, was far less attractive, where their ability fund short-falls
depended upon the financial ability of a significant percentage of
unit owners. The concern over the stability of cooperative own-
ers as borrowers was greatly heightened when, in the 1920s and
1930s, many cooperative corporations became bankrupt."
Thereafter, cooperative apartments became quite unpopular not
only with lenders but also with prospective unit purchasers as
those purchasers became aware that their ability to protect their
investment was wholly dependent upon the ability of their fellow
shareholders to pay their respective shares of building mainte-
nance costs and debt service.
The financing of cooperative units was complicated by a
number of other factors, including the hybrid nature of the secu-
rity offered to a lender and issues as to whether lenders were
authorized to invest in such loan transactions. The individual
unit owner possessed two pieces of security to offer to the unit
lender, namely: the shares of stock in the cooperative corporation
and the proprietary lease. The early lenders believed that they
had to have security interests in both properties in order to be
truly secure. The problem was that the stock was clearly per-
sonal property (governed by the individual State statutes that
preceded the Uniform Commercial Code),4' while the lease could
4 "It is reported ... that in the 1930s, seventy-five percent of the cooperatives
in the Chicago and New York areas failed.... Correspondents, almost without ex-
ception, bear evidence to the fact that widespread failure was the story elsewhere as
well." Note, Co-operative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1407, 1410 & n.25
(1948).
"The Uniform Commercial Code was not adopted until the 1960s. See Robert S.
Summers, Symposium, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Con-
ceptualization, 67 COREMLL L. REV. 810, 813 (1982) ("By the late 1960s, [the U.C.C.]
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be treated as either real property or personal property.45 There
were significant issues as to how a lender could foreclose on its
security, such as whether the lender was merely acquiring the
shares or was foreclosing on the real estate interests created by
the lease, or both.46
Although today banks are authorized to engage in a wide
variety of lending, most often over a wide geographic area, real
estate lending in the early part of this century was far more re-
stricted by statute.47 The ability to make loans to the owners of
cooperative units received a boost when amendments to several
sections of the National Housing Act granted several federal
agencies, including the FHA, the authority to participate in loans
secured by cooperative apartments.4" However, it was not until
the 1980s that the making of loans secured by cooperative
apartments became uncomplicated.49
had been adopted in a majority of states."). New York, for example, adopted the
U.C.C. in 1962. See N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 1-101 (McKinney 1993).
See, e.g., In re Fort Hamilton Manor, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 856, 858 (N.Y. 1958)
("Under a long line of New York decisions, the interest of a tenant of realty under a
real estate lease is not realty but... is personal property.").
See Schaffer v. Eighty-One Hundred Jefferson Ave. E. Corp., 255 N.W. 324,
327 (Mich. 1934) (presenting the argument that stockholders of a cooperative asso-
ciation are not equitable owners in common of the real estate); James L. Winokur,
Meaner Lienor Community Associations, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 363-64, n. 44
(1992) (citing Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, which recognizes the hy-
brid nature of cooperative ownership); 15A AM. JUR. 2D Foreclosure of Mortgage on
Building § 86 (1976) ("Since a tenant-stockholder is not an owner of real estate but
merely a lessee who owns stock in his lessor, he is not a necessary party to a suit for
foreclosure of the mortgage on the apartment property.").
47 The Acts of 1863 and 1864, which provided for the organization of national
banks, denied them the power to make loans on the security of real estate. In 1878,
the United States Supreme Court expressed as one of the underlying reasons for
that denial the intention to keep national banks from embarking on "hazardous real
estate speculation." National Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 626 (1878). The re-
striction was partially lifted by the Acts of December 22, 1913 (ch. 6, § 24, 38 Stat.
273 (1913)), and September 7, 1916 (ch. 461, § 24, 39 Stat. 754 (1916)), which were
incorporated into the National Banking Act as Section 371, which limited national
banks to making loans secured by improved and unencumbered real estate located
within 100 miles of the bank's place of business. See ch. 191, § 16, 24 Stat. 1232
(1927) (amending § 24 of the Federal Reserve Act). That statute was continually lib-
eralized, so that national banks today have no geographic limitations and have ex-
tremely broad lending powers. New York has liberalized its banking laws as well.
See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 1993).
48 Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715 (1946) with 12 U.S.C. § 1715e (1994) (including §
1715e, which the former does not contain, and providing for "cooperative housing
insurance").
49 See, e.g., New Jersey's Cooperative Recording Act N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8D-2
(West 1989) (explaining that "this cooperative recording act" offers purchasers
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Because of the problems generated by cooperative corpora-
tion failures in the 1920s and 1930s, the boards of directors of
surviving and new cooperative corporations became very con-
cerned about the financial wherewithal of shareholders. These
highlighted concerns intensified the practice in which prospec-
tive purchasers of cooperative apartment units are required to
submit detailed financial statements to the board of the coop-
erative and required to subject themselves to a significant inter-
viewing process before they will be permitted to purchase shares
in the cooperative corporation. In many instances, the process
goes far beyond mere economic considerations and focuses on
"quality-of-life" issues for the other unit owners in the building."
For example, some prospective purchasers have been turned
down simply because of their status as celebrities.5 The rules
governing most cooperative apartments permit the co-op board to
reject prospective purchasers (although they may not do so on a
basis that would be discriminatory under traditional tests).52
By contrast, the board of a condominium generally has no
right to reject prospective purchasers. If a condo board wants to
interdict a proposed sale, its only recourse is to exercise a right
of first refusal to purchase the condo unit on the same terms that
the unacceptable purchaser was willing to purchase. However,
condo boards have begun to follow some of the practices of co-op
"those protections available in transactions for the purchase of real estate,....
[including] the equivalent of a mortgage where a cooperative unit is the "asset to be
pledged as security for the purchase loans").
"[Tihere is no reason why the owners of the co-operative apartment house
could not decide for themselves with whom they wish to share their elevators, their
common halls and facilities, their stockholders' meetings, their management prob-
lems and responsibilities, and their homes." Weisner v. 791 Park Ave. Corp., 160
N.E.2d 720, 724 (N.Y. 1959).
r1 There are many examples of prospective purchasers being turned down sim-
ply because of their status as celebrities. Notable examples of these include former
president Richard M. Nixon, Ron Perlman, Sol Goldman, and Barbra Streisand. See,
e.g., Tony Schwartz, Nixon Drops Purchase of Co-op Following Residents' Com-
plaints, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1979, at Al (discussing the concerns of residents in the
cooperative building that "the former President might attract extra attention to the
building and result in an invasion of their privacy" as well as pose "security prob-
lems"). Co-op boards usually identify concerns for the safety and security of both
their current owners as well as the prospective purchaser as the reasons for the re-
jection (to the extent that the board ever gives a reason for the rejection in the first
instance).
52 See generally Maldonado & Rose, supra note 13, at 1255-56 (describing the
power of cooperative boards to "arbitrar[ily] withhold.., consent absent a violation
of discrimination laws").
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boards by demanding that prospective purchasers of condo units
submit financial data.53
As banks became more comfortable with their authority to
make loans secured by cooperative apartments, lending conven-
tions became fairly well-defined. Lenders would take a "pledge"
of the stock, which would be perfected by possession of that stock
by the lender. An assignment of the proprietary lease would be
recorded in the land records, and the lenders would obtain a
"recognition agreement" from the cooperative corporation. In the
"recognition agreement," the corporation would agree that if the
borrower (unit "owner") were to default in its obligation to the
cooperative corporation, the corporation would give notice to the
lender and would provide the lender with the opportunity to cure
that default before the cooperative corporation foreclosed upon
the unit. Many proprietary leases also provided assurances that
if the lender were to "foreclose" on its security, the cooperative
corporation would accept the lender as a unit purchaser in the
building at the foreclosure.' However, in most instances, nei-
ther the lender nor any other purchaser at the foreclosure sale
would have the right to occupy the unit without the approval of
the cooperative corporation.
Over time, unit loans on cooperative apartments became
relatively commonplace. During the 1960s and 1970s, lenders'
default experiences with cooperative apartments did not differ
" In addition to asking for copies of the contract, condominium boards are now
asking for the three most recent federal income tax returns for prospective purchas-
ers, although most boards can be persuaded to accept an accountant's statement of
net worth.,
A typical recognition agreement provision reads as follows:
12. The Lender shall have the right to foreclose or otherwise enforce its
lien on the Shares and Lease, or to acquire the Shares and Lease by as-
signment in lieu of foreclosure, and transfer its interest therein as pro-
vided for in the agreements between the Lender and the Shareholder,
provided that there shall be no right to occupy the Apartment without any
approval of the Corporation required by the Lease. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Lender shall have the right to have the Lease and the
Shares transferred in the books and records of the Corporation and issued
in the Lender's name or the name of its designee. If requested by the
Lender the Corporation agrees to cooperate with the Lender to obtain pos-
session of the Apartment after default by the Shareholder. Such coopera-
tion will include the termination of the Lease and commencement of ap-
propriate legal proceedings by the Corporation provided that the Lender
agrees to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Corporation's
counsel.
J. Blumberg, Inc., Standard Form Recognition Agreement Form T394.
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significantly from defaults on condominium units. By the mid-
1980s, unit mortgages on both forms of ownership were consid-
ered customary and had long since become eligible for sale in the
secondary mortgage market.55
III. THE CONVERSION GAME
By the mid-1980s, with the real estate market once again
extremely hot, many developers turned their attention to cashing
out of residential real estate or cashing in on substantially de-
pressed value residential real estate projects. Several cities, in
particular New York, had long ago adopted rent control and rent
stabilization laws that severely restricted the amount of money
that the owner of residential real estate could charge tenants as
rent.*6 Properties subject to rent control or rent stabilization
had, and still have, significantly depressed values because of
these restrictive statutes.57 As a result, the supply of rental
property deteriorated both in number and quality of units. The
general sense was, and still is, that in those cities with such rent
control or rent stabilization statutes, no developer in his or her
right mind would construct residential rental property that could
be subject to rent restricting statutes.58 In cities with rent con-
trol statutes that exempt luxury accommodations from rent re-
striction, the only new rental apartment constructed were
buildings containing only luxury units. Otherwise, developers in
Fundamentally, the secondary mortgage market covers all transactions in-
volving the transfer of ownership of a loan after it has been closed by the original
lender. "MThe initial role of the secondary market was to smooth out regional imbal-
ances in the supply and demand for mortgage money.... More recently, the secon-
dary market has also increasingly been used to expand housing's linkage with the
capital markets." CHARLES L. EDSON & BARRY G. JACOBS, SECONDARY MORTGAGE
MARKET GUIDE § 1.03[1], at 1-15 (1997).
'; The Emergency Housing Rent Control Law was enacted in 1946 "to prevent
exactions of unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental agreements and
to forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices tending to pro-
duce threats to the public health." N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8581 (McKinney 1987).
7 "[Rent control diminishes the value of apartment buildings .... " William A.
Fischel, Lead Us Not Into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preservation, and Rent
Control, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 749, 752 (1995); see also Calvin R. Massey, Takings
and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLVY 85, 92 (1996) (stating
"compensation (in the form of rent) is always below the fair market value because
that is the whole point of rent control").
r' See GEORGE STERNLIEB & JAMES W. HUGHES, THE FUTURE OF RENTAL
HOUSING 92 (1981) (explaining that during "a time of inflation, owners and lenders
simply are not willing to venture into areas in which the absolute rents (as well as
the rates of return) will be limited").
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rent-controlled jurisdictions were building only cooperative and
condominium residences for sale.
During the same period of time, enterprising real estate
players were buying under-valued residential apartment build-
ings that were subject to rent control and rent stabilization, con-
verting those buildings into cooperatives and condominiums"
and selling the units, which ultimately would break the rent con-
trol or rent stabilization cycle. If a unit in a newly converted co-
operative or condominium building was occupied by a rent-
controlled or rent-stabilized tenant, the developer endeavored to
sell the unit first to the tenant at a special bargain "insider
price," '° and if that endeavor failed, the developer thereafter
would offer the occupied unit to investors subject to the existing
occupancy. The investor-purchaser of a tenant-occupied unit
made that purchase on what that investor hoped would turn out
to be a bargain price, with the further hope that the protected
tenant would move (or die),6 thereby leaving the investor-
purchaser free to resell the unit at a much higher price, namely,
at a price no longer depressed by rent control or rent stabiliza-
tion.6"
"' The concept of conversion started before the 1980s but really gained momen-
tum in the mid 1980s. See Victoria A. Judson, Defining Property Rights: The Consti-
tutionality of Protecting Tenants From Condominium Conversion, 18 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 179, 179 n.1 (1983). The author cites statistics showing that between
1970 and 1976, 106,000 units were converted and between 1976 and 1979, 260,000
rental units were converted. See id. During this period of time, the author of this
article represented developers in several conversions and represented both lenders
and developers (in separate projects) in individual project financings and in bulk
condominium and corporate financings.
60 See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352-eeee(2)(d)(ix) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 1998)
(detailing the right of occupants to purchase the converted apartments); Jeffrey G.
Abrandt, Housing Issues for the Elderly: Programs Available to the Elderly of Mod-
est Means or Less, 196 PRAC. L. INST. EST. PLAN & ADMIN. 329, 353-55 (1990)
(discussing special rights the elderly have in some states to protect them if their
apartments are converted).
6' In some instances, even the death of the tenant does not terminate the rent
control applicable to the unit if a close relative of the decedent continues to occupy
the apartment. See N.Y. UNCONSOLID. LAW § 2204.6 (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1998)
See De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., 508 N.E.2d 652, 654, 656 (N.Y.
1987) (denying heirs a "windfall via decedents" at the expense of the owner's rever-
sion rights, because the regulatory statute's intent was to provide emergency relief
for tenants already in occupancy). But see James P. Godman, Note, (E)state of the
Law: An Estate's Right to Purchase Its Decedent's Apartment During a Cooperative
Conversion, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1347, 1372 (1989) ("The estate should have the right
to buy the apartment at the insider price, as long as the offering plan does not ex-
pressly prohibit such sales.").
[73:101
THE FINANCING OF CO-OPS AND CONDOS
In the frenzy to finance the wave of cooperative and condo-
minium construction and conversion, lenders once again began to
compete with each other for the opportunity to take security in-
terests in the developers' units. In this highly competitive mar-
ket, borrowers were able to insist that the loans be made on a
fully exculpated basis, meaning that the lenders' only recourse in
the event of default would be to foreclose on the security, with no
right to pursue any of the borrowers' other assets even in the
event of a deficiency.' Lenders made bulk-unit loans to develop-
ers with respect to which security interests were classified as:
(a) developer-unsold shares in cooperatives (in which case the
lender took a security interest in the shares of stock and the pro-
prietary lease owned by the developer), (b) developer-unsold con-
dominium unites (in which case the developer's bulk lender took
a mortgage or deed of trust on the unites) or (c) developer-sold
units (in which case, since the only remaining interest that the
developer would have after the unit was sold would have been
whatever purchase-money security interest that the developer
may have retained in either a co-op or a condo, the developer's
bulk-lender took collateral assignments of the purchase-money
loan documents and security taken back by the developer from
the new unit purchasers). Each category of collateral was fur-
ther subdivided into additional categories of occupied and unoc-
cupied units, depending upon whether the apartment or unit was
occupied by a non-owning tenant. The loans were usually made
on the basis of a loan-to-value ratio (i.e., the amount of the loan
would be a percentage, usually seventy-five to eighty percent, of
the estimated gross sales price of the units). Although these es-
timated sales prices were frequently tested by appraisal, the val-
ues of the appraisals were predicated on then-soaring (and in
hindsight, grossly unrealistic) values. Frequently, in order to
hype the price of the units, the developers promised to make
substantial improvements in the building or to make substantial
contributions to reserve funds of the cooperative corporation or
During the 1960s and 1970s, exculpation provisions tended to be plenary. The
borrower was simply not liable for anything beyond its interest in the property. By
the 1980s, "carve-outs" became more prevalent in exculpation provisions. While the
borrower would not be liable generally for any obligations beyond the value of the
real estate hypothecated as security for the loan, the borrower would be liable for
such matters as fraud (which in reality the borrower may have been liable for even
under earlier exculpation provisions), waste, environmental problems, and misuse of
insurance proceeds.
1999]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the condominium association, or both.6 In any event, lenders
and developers alike were again raking in big profits and the
condo and co-op purchasers were delighted with their new ac-
quisitions. Everyone was happy.
IV. THE SECOND DOWNTURN
When the real estate market collapsed again, at the end of
the 1980s, lenders found that the value of the cooperative
apartment and condominium units with respect to which they
held security was worth far less than the aggregate amount of
the loan, and because the loan was fully exculpated, they had no
recourse against the borrower. Lenders took tremendous losses
on these bulk-unit loans.
Those who had purchased cooperative and condominium
units in the buildings in many instances were faced with the loss
of their own investments. With the decline of the real estate
market, cooperative and condominium apartment owners found
that the resale values of their units were only a fraction of what
they had recently paid for those units and less than the debt that
they had incurred in acquiring the units. Those who purchased
occupied units found that even if they were lucky enough to have
their rent-controlled or rent-stabilized tenant move out, the re-
sidual value of the unit was still less than the "discounted" price
that they had paid for the unit. But that was nowhere near the
worst of the problems. 5 Those who had the misfortune of pur-
Indeed, some developers promised swimming pools and tennis courts to entice
buyers. When developers reneged on their promises of such improvements, state
legislatures responded by passing laws to characterize pre-purchase promises as
express warranties and required the promises to be in the offering prospectus. See
Carol Jane Brown, Note, Special Declarant Rights and Obligations Following Mort-
gage Foreclosure on Condominium Developments, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 463, 464
(1983); Doris Ware McCall, New Law on Condos Means Developers Must Own Up to
Promises, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Sept. 18, 1983, available in 1983 WL 2097588.
Many developers advertised artificially low monthly maintenance fees to attract
buyers. The monthly maintenance fees cover common area elements such as drive-
way paving, heating and air conditioning units, and recreational amenities. See
Kathy Trocheck, What's Good About Condos in Soft Market, ATLANTA J. & CONST. at
L1, May 4, 1976, available in 1986 WL 2821761. Low maintenance fees produced
insufficient financial reserves at many condominiums, leaving no cushion for unex-
pected maintenance projects. See Bradley Inman, Good Buys in Condos Entice Home
Seekers, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB. Sept. 3, 1989, at F19, available in 1989 WL
6950754 (citing tougher regulation of condominium association monthly mainte-
nance fees).
65 See Lisa S. Lim, An Overview of the Effects of Cooperative Sponsor Defaults,
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chasing one or more units in cooperative or condominium build-
ings in which the developer still had a significant number of un-
sold units faced additional problems.
As the real estate market declined, the number of sales of
co-ops and condos slowed to a crawl. Developers had been de-
pending upon the cash flow from a quick sell-out of their inven-
tory of unsold units to service the debt to the lender who had
provided financing based upon the developer's unsold units and
purchase money mortgages. Because the composition of bulk
loans generally had a small component of developer-held pur-
chase-money mortgages and a large component of unsold units,
the cash flow from the purchase-money mortgages was not suffi-
cient to service the developer's debt. With unit sales inadequate
to generate additional cash flow and to reduce the developer's
debt, the developers were left with a choice of either funding the
shortfall from their own personal wealth to support the debt that
was (with the decline in value of units) now more than the value
of the units, or walking away from the project, knowing that the
developer's debt was fully exculpated from any further liability
to the developer's lender. The choice was obvious.
When the developers walked away from the projects, they
also stopped paying the maintenance charges on the developer-
owned units. Where developers still owned substantial numbers
of units, the impact on the other unit owners was devastating."
Not only would the condominium or the cooperative corporation
not receive the developers' payments needed for the maintenance
of the building, in the case of the cooperative corporation, the
problem was compounded if the cooperative's building itself was
subject to a large building mortgage.
In most cases, cooperative buildings carried (and still carry)
sizable building mortgages, in addition to the debt secured by the
unit that the unit owner may have incurred. Those building
mortgages may have been there for quite some time, but more
frequently, the developer acquired the building as an underval-
ued rent-controlled or rent-stabilized project by borrowing a high
percentage of the purchase price secured by a mortgage on the
building. The developer then borrowed additional money, also
21 REAL EST. L.J. 349, 350 (1993) (reasoning that sponsor defaults leading to fore-
closure will likely wipe out the equity interests of the unit owners).FS See id. at 355 (detailing the greater financial burdens to the tenant-share-
holders when a sponsor retains a large percentage of units).
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secured by a mortgage on the building, the proceeds of which
would be used to "spruce up" the building for conversion, to cover
the cost of the conversion itself, and the costs of marketing the
newly created cooperative units. With no maintenance payments
being made by the developer from which debt service could be
paid by the corporation, the co-op board generally was unable to
service the entire building mortgage debt from increased main-
tenance to be paid by the remaining unit owners or from a capi-
tal call (which usually failed) against those remaining unit own-
ers. As a result, a significant number of building mortgage loans
fell into default. Obviously, a foreclosure of the building mort-
gage would wipe out the equity interests of the unit purchasers
and the security in those units that the unit purchasers had
given to the banks that had loaned the money to enable the unit
purchasers to buy their respective units.
In many instances, the developer also defaulted in obliga-
tions set forth in the prospectus or other documents governing
the co-op or the condominium, including (a) obligations with re-
spect to deferred maintenance,67 (b) upgrades in the building that
were to have been provided by the developer, and (c) contribu-
tions of substantial amounts of money that were to have been
made by the developer to the cooperative corporation's or the
condominium's reserve fund.'
In an effort to protect their investments, unit owners sued
the developers only to find that the developers were insulated by
business entities that had no meaningful assets beyond the now
valueless (to the developer) unsold units. 9 There were even in-
stances in which these aggrieved unit owners brought actions
against the lenders who had foreclosed the security in the devel-
opers' unsold shares or units and taken over those units, claim-
ing that the lender had also taken over the developers' obliga-
'7 Deferred maintenance, as the words imply, refers to matters of building
maintenance that have not been addressed in timely fashion. To the extent that a
building has experienced some degree of deterioration in building systems or cos-
metics, the problems are euphemistically referred to as "deferred maintenance."
" Most cooperatives and condominiums establish reserve funds to take care of
known existing problems for the building, including deferred maintenance. The fund
is also necessary as a method of accumulating money over a period of time for iden-
tifiable recurring building needs, such as the replacement of the roof and mechani-
cal systems, including air conditioning and heating components.69 See generally Brown, supra note 64, at 468-69.
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tions with respect to the building." Another principal problem
for the lenders was, and still is, that public officials are reluctant
to countenance foreclosure judgments against the shareholder
unit owners of a cooperative apartment building, the net result
of which would be to terminate the rights of all of the unit own-
ers.71 This political atmosphere added to the lender's risk in
making cooperative building loans. This atmosphere was at a
crisis level in 1991, when it was estimated that there were 500
buildings in New York where sponsor defaults had led to serious
delinquencies in the underlying building mortgages.72 A foreclo-
sure on the building would normally wipe out the ownership in-
terest of the cooperative corporation and all of the proprietary
leases, but courts have held that those units that continue to be
occupied by non-owner, rent-controlled or rent-stabilized tenants
are unaffected by the foreclosure and that the rights of the pro-
tected tenants survive the foreclosure."3 Likewise, those unit
owners who were themselves protected tenants prior to the con-
version to the cooperative form of ownership are generally held
to regain the rights of protected tenants following the foreclo-
sure, although they would have nonetheless suffered the loss of
any equity they invested when they purchased their unit.74 The
bottom line for the lenders, however, was that when they did
complete a foreclosure on a building, the building was worth far
less than the lender had anticipated. The lender had underwrit-
ten the loan as one secured by an unregulated cooperative
apartment building, and wound up with a building populated in
significant part by rent-controlled and rent-stabilized tenants.
Once again, based in part on the bad experiences of lenders
with respect to condominium and cooperative loans and on bad
experiences with real estate loans of all kinds in general, senior
managers at many lending institutions vowed that they would
70 See 142 East 49th St. Owners Corp. v. BRT Realty Trust, N.Y. L.J., July 9,
1997, at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding that the successor of unsold shares was
obligated to distribute the shares to financially responsible individuals and may be
held liable for defaults in payments of maintenance).
71 See De Santis v. White Rose Assocs., 578 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
7 See Daniel Wise, Foreclosure Ordered for East Side Co-Op; Sponsor Defaults
on Mortgage Payments, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 13, 1991, at 1.
7See De Santis, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 9, §
2504.1 (1991), stating that protection applies only to occupants who have not de-
faulted on their rent).
74 See id. at 367 (citing Greenberg v. Colonial Studios, 107 N.Y.S.2d 87, 87 (App.
Div. 1951)).
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never again become involved in real estate lending.
V. ANOTHER RECOVERY
The early part of the 1990s was a time of depressed values
for real estate, and lender reticence about becoming involved in
real estate lending continued. It was during this absence of tra-
ditional real estate sources of financing that Wall Street took an
interest in real estate. More precisely stated, Wall Street took
an interest in anything that produced an income stream, on the
theory that any income stream could be securitized, and looked
to the income streams produced by debt service on mortgages.
Taking the concept of the secondary mortgage market to a new
plateau, the investment banking houses gobbled up home loans
irrespective of whether they were secured by traditional single
family homes, condominium units or cooperative apartments.75
Like Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac, 76 the investment
bankers and rating agencies required standardized loan forms,
standardized underwriting procedures, sophisticated loan moni-
toring and a review and rating of the proposed security by a
rating agency.7 7  These loans were pooled by the investment
bankers and placed into the hands of trustees, who would admin-
ister the pool. Security interests were sold either in private
placements to small groups or to single sophisticated investors,
or by public offering to the general public as an investment in an
"asset-backed security."
Traditional lenders came streaming back into the market-
75 See KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE BACKED SECU-
RITIES, DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET § 1.03
(1997).
76 Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA" or "Fannie Mae") was once a
government agency and is now a private, stockholder-owned, taxpaying corporation;
Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA" or "Ginnie Mae") is a gov-
ernment agency (which is part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment), whose function, among others, is to guarantee principal and interest on
FHA and VA mortgages sold in the secondary market; and Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC" or "Freddie Mac") is a government-sponsored sec-
ondary market agency, which was originally established to provide a secondary
market for savings and loan associations, but which now is authorized to purchase
loans from virtually all originators. See EDSON & JACOBS, supra note 55, § 1.03[2],
at 1-16 to 1-17.
77 See LORE & COWAN, supra note 75, § 9.01, at 9-1 (stating that "ratings are es-
sential to a strong Mortgage Backed Security because they make the security more
readily acceptable and create the enhanced liquidity that is essential to many inves-
tors").
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place with the understanding that they would now be fulfilling
the role of intermediaries. They would make home loans, receive
up-front fees and promptly sell the home loans either into the
secondary mortgage market or to the investment banking houses
for the next securitization. These plays fulfilled the life-long
dream of lenders to make significant fee income while laying off
100% of the long-term market risk to the secondary mortgage
market, and, ultimately, to the general public.
Loans on whole projects, as well as unit loans and home
loans, are available for securitization. While loans to cooperative
corporations are not attractive to lenders, in general they have
been and continue to be available, although more conservatively
underwritten. These too can be securitized. Further, for the
first time it is becoming easier for condominium associations to
borrow money, because condominiums are now being permitted
to grant liens on condominium property. The recent enactment
of section 339(jj)"8 in New York is evidence of this trend. This
change in law makes the condominium more similar to the coop-
erative apartment in providing flexibility to the board of direc-
tors of the condominium to borrow money for needed improve-
ments to the building or the project. There does not appear to be
any reason why such loans could not be sold in the secondary
market or securitized, although the rating of both the co-op
building loan and the new condo building loan may be at the low
end of the rating spectrum, if they can be rated at all.
While the pooling of residential mortgages in the secondary
market has become a staple in the lending industry, more re-
cently, Wall Street has been securitizing commercial loans, in-
cluding loans on hotels, office buildings, industrial buildings and
residential buildings.79 The emergence of this world of securiti-
zation initially appeared to ensure the existence of a steady
supply of cash to the real estate industry from new creditors.
However, the sudden and steep drop in the stock market in the
second half of 1998 brought an immediate halt to the seemingly
unstoppable securitization trend. For the remainder of 1998 se-
curitized financing was virtually unavailable and several Wall
78 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-j (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998) (applying retro-
actively to all condominiums formed after 1997).
73 See LORE & COWAN, supra note 75, at 1-11. The author of this article has rep-
resented lenders and borrowers in securitized loan transactions and pooled lending
arrangements including securitization involving trophy office buildings.
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Street houses took substantial losses on unsold pools of real es-
tate security. The early part of 1999 has not seen much im-
provement in this sector of financing. Nonetheless, borrowers
are still attracted by the lower interest rates offered by securi-
tized lenders despite higher up-front costs and fees when com-
pared to more traditional lending sources. However, the hidden
cost to the borrower in a securitized financing comes from a loss
of flexibility.
Historically, when times have become difficult in the real es-
tate lending world, lenders and borrowers have endeavored to
"work out" problem loans, in some cases quite successfully. De-
velopers had become used to dealing with lenders who were
willing to work with them in creating the loan and, if the devel-
oper maintained his creditability with the lender, the developer
could expect that the lender would be responsive when the de-
veloper sought the lender's help when times became tough. In
prior times, many of the more sophisticated developers were ac-
tually willing to pay slightly more in interest to borrow from a
lender with whom that developer had a long-standing good rela-
tionship. Banks frequently marketed "relationship" banking to
make their loans." With securitization, the game has changed
dramatically. Once a loan has been transferred to a trustee, the
trustee's actions will be governed by a trust indenture which
mandates that a trustee must foreclose upon a property if a loan
is delinquent to any material degree for a period of a specified
number of days (usually not longer than sixty days). Because of
the nature of the trust arrangement, the trustee cannot engage
in work-out discussions without a modification or waiver of some
of the trust restrictions. This is so notwithstanding the fact that
the work-out may well be the course of action that would yield
the greatest return to the holders of the securitized interests,
and provide some measure of protection and return to the devel-
oper.
In that respect, the securitization format is a formulation for
disaster to the borrower and unnecessarily increased risk of loss
to the investors on the lending side of the transaction. The trust
indenture requirement of foreclosure was no doubt added with
8o See Kenneth Silber, Data Base Marketing: Just How Personal?, U.S. BANKER,
Feb. 1998 (stating that banks focus more intently on relationship banking because
maintaining close customer contact is difficult in an era of large institutions and
mass markets).
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the intention of providing the investor with a higher degree of
comfort (and therefore security) that delinquencies would be
promptly addressed. The problem is that mindlessly requiring
the trustee to commence a foreclosure proceeding as the only
course of action following a default fails to provide a means that
will afford the investor the best result, which might be available
only from some other course of action. If the securitization is ef-
fected by a sale of all of the securities to a single person or insti-
tution, there is hope of salvaging the loan with a workout be-
cause that single investor could easily direct the trustee to
engage in a workout. The single investor would likely engage in
workout negotiations directly with the borrower without signifi-
cant involvement from the trustee.
On the other hand, if there are multiple owners of the secu-
rity, it is less likely for a workout to be effected because it would
require a modification or waiver of the trust indenture8 and a
willingness of all of the investors to pursue the same workout
terms. Frequently, where there are multiple investors in a loan
transaction, either as investors in a securitized loan or as par-
ticipants in a traditional non-securitized loan, the participants
are motivated by significantly diverse agendas and are fre-
quently unable to work to a common goal or workout.82 It must
be noted that in securitization transactions, the borrower waives
any right to control whether the security is sold to a single or
multiple purchasers. The bottom line is that with securitization,
8' Typically, a trust indenture will require approval of two-thirds of the benefi-
cial interests in order to permit a waiver or modification of provisions of that trust
indenture. See Felicia Smith, Applicability of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 to Consent Solicitations to Amend Trust Indentures, 35
HOW. L.J. 343, 347 (1992) (stating that any amendment-such as changes in the
maturity of principal, interest, impairment of right to sue, or reduction in princi-
pal-affecting the fundamental essence of the security requires majority consent).
' There are far too many examples of situations in which a lender made a com-
mercial loan, sold participations in that loan to other lenders and thereafter was
faced with difficulties in workout situations. Participants have argued over whether
foreclosure should have been commenced, and whether the property acquired in
foreclosure should be disposed of and how, to whom, and for how much. Frequently,
participants holding a small percentage of the loan would refuse to support any ra-
tional plan of action in the hope that they could be such an annoyance to those
holding major interests in the loan that the holder of the major interests would
simply buy back the interest of the obstinate minority participant, thus guarantee-
ing a full recovery to that recalcitrant participant. See Daniel B. Bogart, Games
Lawyers Play: Waivers of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy and the Single Asset
Loan Workout, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1117, 1193-94, n.234 (1996) (observing that some
lenders gain significant negotiation advantage by remaining obstinate).
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the borrower gains some economic advantage with respect to in-
terest costs but loses significant mobility if the market "turns
south" or if the borrower is confronted with unanticipated prob-
lems.
VI. CONCLUSION (FOR NOW)
We have seen the condominium mature as an ownership
form and have watched it advance from a financing curiosity to a
fully accepted form to serve as security for a loan. We have also
witnessed the acceptance of the condominium by the general
public to the point where prospective purchasers would express
little preference for conventional fee ownership over the owner-
ship of a condominium. The cooperative form of ownership has
fully recovered from the black eye that it received in the early
part of this century, to the point that co-ops are very popular
among prospective purchasers in those cities in which the coop-
erative form of ownership is employed. While lenders may still
comment that co-op financing is more difficult, co-op financing
nonetheless remains readily available.
During the twentieth century and particularly since the ad-
vent of the condominium phenomenon in the United States, we
have witnessed several cycles of the real estate market. There is
a constancy to the pattern. Lenders tread cautiously as the up-
swing begins. As the upswing matures, lenders are competing to
lend into a highly profitable financing boom and the prices of
real estate continue to climb to the delight of (a) developers (who
are able to earn huge profits while doing real estate deals with
less and less of their own money invested in their own projects
as the markets heat up); (b) lenders (who are able to earn sizable
fees for booking new loans); and (c) homeowners (who are acquir-
ing residential property at prices that they believe will continue
to rise). As the cycle hits its apex, prices of real estate have
grown to new heights with the expectation of almost everyone
that the market will continue to rise for the foreseeable future,
all of which is supported by appraisals. In each cycle, the lend-
ing community takes comfort in financing techniques that they
perceive to be "new" (although they are in reality at most a
variation on techniques employed in the past). And at the end of
the upswing, the market is invariably undone by the fact that
the market had become overvalued. The decline is generally a
correction, but one that is so steep that it results in an overcor-
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rection. Everyone loses money and vows never to make the same
mistakes again. And while some individuals may in fact never
again get caught up in another real estate debacle, there will
always be enough players to guarantee that the cycles will con-
tinue to roll. The land will always be there, someone will always
make a lot of money in real estate and others will follow. The
magic is in knowing where we are in the cycle at all times.
At the present time in the pre-spring days of 1999, lenders
and developers alike are raking in big profits, and condo and co-
op purchasers are delighted with their new homes. Everyone is
happy.8
However, the mood was shaken for a short period of time. In August 1998,
Russia defaulted on its bonds, resulting in a concomitant erosion of confidence in the
Asian and Latin American bond markets. Investors turned away from mortgage
backed securities to safer U.S. Treasury bonds. The supply of funds from Wall
Street for real estate dried up. Property values dropped as much as 25 percent from
June 1998 to November 1998. See Laura M. Holson & Charles V. Bagli, Lending
Without a Net, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, § 3, at 1. (noting that the real estate boom
fueled by securitization "came to a screeching halt when global turmoil roiled mar-
kets in late summer"). Since then, the stock market has rebounded to new-record
highs, public confidence in the economy is strong, property values have returned to
pre-downturn levels and real estate transactions are occurring at a fast pace, mak-
ing the downturn in the second-half of 1998 appear (at this time) to have been
nothing more than a hiccup in the economy. However, changes have occurred. Se-
curitized lenders are still essentially on the sidelines and REITs which had been ex-
traordinarily aggressive over the past several years are becoming less active in the
acquisition of real estate. Nonetheless, money is still readily available for deals from
insurance companies, some banks and from offshore investors. Individual purchas-
ers continue to buy residential units at a high volume and at high prices. How long
this positive portion of the real estate cycle will continue is anyone's guess.
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